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Understanding the mechanisms at the origin of cooperation is a major challenge to Darwin’s
natural selection theory [1]: If only the fittest individuals survive, how to explain the ubiquity
of cooperation? Among many examples of altruistic behaviors, one can mention insects that
coordinate their efforts for the benefit of their “queen” [2].
In this context, Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT), see e.g. [3, 4, 5, 6, 7], provides a suitable
framework to address this question by means of parsimonious models in which each agent’s re-
productive potential (expected payoff or fitness) depends on the others’ fitness. In infinitely large
populations, the abundance of the competing species/strategies is described by their “replicator
(nonlinear differential) equations” and, in such a mean field setting, the evolutionary stable strate-
gies of symmetric two-strategy games can readily be found in terms of two parameters directly
obtained by rescaling the entries of the payoff matrix. In what follows, we will refer to this oper-
ation as the “replicator parametrization”. Interestingly, the fitness optimization at an individual
level may cause the reduction of the population’s average fitness yielding a “social dilemma”, as
in the celebrated two-strategy prisoner’s dilemma, snowdrift and stag-hunt games [3, 4, 5, 6, 7].
At mean field level, these cooperation dilemmas can easily and comprehensively be analysed by
using the replicator parametrization. However, when the size of the population is finite, stochastic
effects play an important role and the notion of evolutionary stability needs to be refined: In the
simple case of two-strategy games, a strategy is evolutionary stable (ESSN) in a well-mixed finite
population if it has a higher fitness than the alternative strategy, and if a single player adopting
the mutant-strategy has a lower fixation probability than in the absence of selection. The latter
condition accounts for the selection to oppose the replacement by the alternative strategy [9].
Due to these two conditions, whether a strategy is an ESSN cannot inferred by simply rescaling
the payoff matrix and a comprehensive analysis of the dilemmas can no longer be carried out by
using only the replicator paramatrization.
In their review article [10], Wang et al. propose to describe the classical two-player social
dilemmas in terms of a new set of parameters, obtained by generalizing the approach used in
Ref. [8] for the so-called donor-and-recipient prisoner’s dilemma game. By focusing chiefly on
the case of well-mixed finite populations, the authors of Ref. [10] show that the parametrization
that they put forward is both a natural and efficient choice to analyze the properties of symmetric
two-player games. Wang et al. make their point by revisiting five popular reciprocity mech-
anisms [8] and the necessary replacement condition for a strategy to be an ESSN under weak
selection [9]. They show that their new parametrization allows to re-derive non-trivial results in
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a simple and general manner, and is therefore superior to the replicator parametrization. As a
further application, Wang et al. also demonstrate that the use of their set of parameters allows to
resolve an apparent paradox in some two-strategy game with positive assortment [11]. Moreover,
Wang et al. present a series of numerical investigations on various topologies indicating that the
parametrization that they introduce is also particularly suited to describe the properties of social
dilemmas in spatial settings.
In addition to what the authors of [10] have outlined in their interesting review article, the fol-
lowing open questions may also be considered for possible future research: (i) Is there a natural
generalization of the proposed parametrization for games with more than three pure strategies,
and/or for asymmetric games. (ii) Can the proposed parametrization help reveal in a simple and
transparent way what are the conditions for a strategy to be an ESSN under selection of arbitrary
strength? (iii) Would the proposed parametrization help describe the properties of cooperation
dilemmas in the presence of “facilitators” or “zealots” considered in Refs. [12, 13, 14]?
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